Do ''Any Willing Provider'' and ''Freedom of Choice'' Laws Affect HMO Market Share?
This study examines the effects of ''any willing provider'' (AWP) and ''freedom of choice'' (FOC) laws on the market share of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in metropolitan statistical areas over the period 1989-95. We use pooled cross-section time-series regression techniques with year and state fixed effects. HMO market share is hypothesized to be a function of state laws, market characteristics, and state preference for managed care regulation. AWP and FOC laws are characterized by three alternative measures of regulatory intensity. The results suggest that FOC laws have a greater impact on market share than do AWP laws. More comprehensive regulation has a bigger impact than less encompassing laws, and laws limiting selective contracting with physicians are more effective in reducing HMO market share than are laws covering hospitals or pharmacies.
During the first half of the 1990s, premiums paid for employer-sponsored health insurance increased at a declining rate. By 1996, they were increasing at rates below that of inflation; since then, however, premiums have increased dramatically. Gabel et al. (2002) estimate that premiums grew by 12.7% in 2002. The prevailing wisdom is that the slowing of premium inflation over the early 1990s was the result of managed care. Gaskin and Hadley (1997) and Melnick et al. (1997) have shown that managed care penetration, together with hospital competition, reduced hospital costs. Simon et al. (1998) have shown that managed care penetration by the mid-1990s had begun to reduce physician incomes. The subsequent increase in premiums has been attributed to reduced competition among providers and to a ''backlash'' against managed care that has led to a relaxing of managed care utilization restrictions (Stires 2002) .
The backlash directed at managed care firms has taken many forms. Providers and consumers have clamored for larger panels of providers in managed care networks and the freedom to step outside the networks to obtain covered medical services from non-network providers. A recent report indicated that 63% of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) paid for treatment outside their networks (Stires 2002) . Demands for less restrictive access were facilitated, in part, by the robust economy of the late 1990s and the ensuing tight labor markets. States have debated-and many have enacted-''anti-gag rules,'' minimum hospital stays for maternity patients, and patients' rights to sue health care plans for denial of needed care. Managed care plans have changed many of their operational conventions. Plans also have reduced their reliance on apparently ineffectual utilization management techniques (Ferris et al. 2001) .
This paper focuses on the potential effects of ''any willing provider'' (AWP) and ''freedom of choice'' (FOC) laws on managed care growth. AWP/FOC laws are a significant component of the first wave of what has been generically labeled as managed care reform legislation-laws that constrain contracting practices or mandate the extent or terms of service coverage. Specifically, AWP laws require that a managed care firm accept into its network of providers any licensed provider willing to accept the terms and conditions of the contract. FOC laws require that a managed care firm allow subscribers to step outside its panel of providers and use a provider of their choice without having to pay the full price for care.
Background
Proponents of AWP and FOC laws argue that the laws assure the quality of care in managed care plans by providing a ''safety valve'' for plan members. Under an AWP law, managed care plans are likely to have a larger number of providers than they would have had in the absence of the law. Under FOC laws, plan members are able to use a provider outside the panel. In either case, plan members may have greater access to providers who, in their judgment, may provide better quality care. Proponents also argue that the laws enable providers to participate in managed care plans. This is said to be particularly valuable to small and rural providers.
Opponents, however, contend that the laws protect provider interests by effectively eliminating selective contracting and the price competition it fosters. A hospital, for example, may offer a low price in hopes of getting additional patient volume. However, when other hospitals can get an identical contract, as they can under AWP laws, the incentive to offer a low price is reduced-or perhaps eliminated. The other hospitals will get some of the first hospital's expected volume, and the advantage from offering a lower price is reduced. Under an FOC law, patients can leave the provider panel and the managed care plan must pay some non-negligible portion of the provider's bill. Under this scenario, the provider has a reduced incentive to offer a lower price. Indeed, the incentive to quote a low price falls as the price elasticity of demand for provider services declines.
The AWP and FOC laws differ among states with respect to the types of managed care firms affected and the providers covered. Some laws apply to HMOs, some to preferred provider organizations (PPOs) and some to both. Some laws apply to pharmacies, some to physicians, and some to hospitals. Many states cover more than one category of provider (see Hellinger 1995 and Ohsfeldt et al. 1998 for a discussion). Table 1 presents the number of states with various types of laws in 1989 and in 1995, the endpoints of this study. By 1995, 11 states had AWP laws applicable to physicians, nine had AWP laws applicable to hospitals, and 25 had laws applicable to pharmacies. In 1995, 30 states had one or more AWP laws applicable to HMOs. As may be surmised from Table 1 , there was significant overlap between HMO and PPO laws that applied to given categories of providers. Much less overlap existed across types of covered providers.
The empirical literature with respect to the effects of AWP and FOC laws is very limited. However, studies that examine the impact of selective contracting provide some indirect evidence concerning the potential impact of these laws. Zwanziger and Melnick (1988) examined hospital cost growth in California before and after the enactment of pro-selective contracting legislation. They found that hospital costs increased less rapidly after enactment in markets with more hospitals. In follow-up work, Melnick et al. (1992) examined the prices hospitals negotiated with a major Blue Cross PPO and found evidence that more hospitals and more excess capacity led to lower transaction prices. They also found that the PPO got a lower price when it had a larger share of the hospital's ''book of business.' ' Feldman et al. (1990) concluded that staff and group model HMOs directed greater volume to hospitals where they had negotiated lower prices.
Only two studies published in peer-reviewed journals provide a direct econometric assessment of the impact of AWP and FOC laws. Vita (2001) , using state-level health spending data for 1980-88 and a fixed-effects methodology, found that states with high AWP/FOC regulatory intensity had per capita total health spending that was $35 to $50 higher per year than states with low regulatory intensity. Presumably, the main effect of regulatory intensity on per capita health spending resulted from higher HMO or PPO costs. This in turn would suggest that the laws might hinder HMO/PPO market share growth by reducing the managed care plans' cost advantage over more traditional health insurance plans. However, Vita did not examine any direct effects of the laws on HMOs or PPOs. Carroll and Ambrose (2002) , using HMOlevel data for 1992-95, focused on the impact of AWP laws on HMO financial performance (they did not consider FOC laws). Carroll and Ambrose concluded that ''all provider'' and ''pharmacy only'' AWP laws had no impact on HMO profitability. They also concluded that all-provider AWP laws reduced the inpatient share of HMO costs by three percentage points (or 12% at sample means), whereas pharmacyonly AWP laws reduced the inpatient cost share by about four percentage points (16% at means). Both all-provider and pharmacy-only AWP laws were associated with an almost six percentagepoint increase in the administrative share of HMO costs (33% at means), but only the pharmacy-only AWP law estimate was statistically significant. Carroll and Ambrose concluded that pharmacy-only AWP laws reduced HMO medical loss ratios, but all-provider AWP laws had no impact. Overall, their results imply, counterintuitively, that AWP laws affecting pharmacies only had a greater impact on HMO financial performance than AWP laws that affected both pharmacies and other providers.
There also have been a number of reports produced by consulting firms, but these typically have had serious analytic flaws. A study by Abt Associates (1994) , for example, explored the differences in list prices and HMO negotiated prices for prescription drugs in Massachusetts. However, it assumed that an AWP would eliminate HMO discounts, and that other providers would not obtain drug discounts. Neither assumption is necessarily plausible. A study by Wyatt (1991) estimated the additional administrative burden of AWP laws. The study estimated the cost per provider in the network, but assumed the number of other providers that would be added as a result of the law, and attributed the average administrative cost to each of them.
The best of the consultant studies is that of Lewin-VHI (Sheils, Stapleton, and Haught 1995) . It examined state-level growth in HMO market share over the 1985-94 period and concluded that AWP and/or FOC laws resulted in a statistically significant reduction in annual growth of nearly 7%. They then related HMO growth to hospital costs to estimate the effects of lower growth on costs. The growth equation included the level and change in lagged market share as well as the levels and changes in population and insurance characteristics. The study, however, considered the state laws to be exogenously determined. As Marsteller et al. (1997) and Ohsfeldt et al. (1998) argue, this is particularly problematic in an analysis using state-level data. If such laws are enacted pre-emptively to retard HMO development, failure to account for these ''tastes'' for regulation likely will overstate the effects of the laws. In this study we use the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) as the market definition, consider a more complete specification of the state laws, and explicitly deal with the sentiments for managed care regulation in the state.
Theory and Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Markets subject to AWP and FOC laws will have smaller managed care penetration than markets without the laws
The expected impact of AWP and FOC laws is straightforward. If the laws are binding, they effectively obligate a managed care firm to expand its network of providers in one or another fashion-either directly by adding providers as in an AWP law, or indirectly by allowing a subscriber to obtain subsidized care from a non-panel member as in FOC laws. These actions would increase administrative costs because the firm must contract and monitor more providers.
The ability of patients to leave the panel for care (under FOC laws) or to have more options for care (under AWP laws) means that a contracting provider cannot expect as many patients. As a consequence, the provider is unlikely to offer to contract with the HMO at as low a price. The higher costs borne by the managed care firm imply that it cannot offer premiums to purchasers of managed care products that are as low as they otherwise would be. As a result, enrollment in managed care plans will be lower and they will have lower market shares.
Hypothesis 2: The impact on market share will be larger in markets with laws applicable to hospitals, physicians, and pharmacies compared to markets with laws affecting only one type of provider
The more comprehensive the coverage of the laws, the greater their potential effects on market share. For example, a managed care firm may be able to minimize the effects of a hospital-only AWP law by channeling patients to ''favored'' hospitals among those with contracts. This could be accomplished by selectively contracting with physicians who have admitting privileges at ''favored'' hospitals. An HMO could negotiate ''declining block tariffs'' in which the price to the HMO declines with successive blocks of admissions. This would give the HMO an incentive to concentrate admissions at a few hospitals, regardless of the number of hospitals with contracts. In the case of a physician-only AWP law, an analogous strategy of using selective hospital contracting to channel patients to ''favored'' physicians could be employed, though this strategy might be less effective due to the heterogeneous nature of hospital medical staffs. Under these scenarios, the effects of an AWP law applying to a single provider type could be negligible.
Hypothesis 3: AWP and FOC laws will have different effects on the market share of managed care firms AWP laws are likely to have different effects than FOC laws. AWP laws bring providers into the provider panel on an equal basis. FOC laws allow subscribers to step outside the panel, but only if they are willing to pay a higher copayment. If subscribers are price sensitive, the higher required copay will serve as a deterrent to use. This suggests that AWP laws will have a greater impact on market share than will FOC laws.
Data and Methods
To test these hypotheses, we estimated an empirical model of the general form:
Market Share ¼ f ðLaws, Market Characteristics, Time, Preferences for RegulationÞ:
. A pooled cross-section time-series model was used with data from the period 1989 to 1995 and was estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with Huber-White corrected standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity. Markets were defined as MSAs. There has been little managed care enrollment in rural areas; metro areas commonly have been used in studies of managed care markets (see, for example, Morrisey and Ashby 1983; McLaughlin 1988; and Wholey, Feldman, and Christianson 1995) . HMO market share data were provided by Douglas Wholey based upon his attribution of enrollment across counties in the InterStudy data (see Wholey, Feldman, and Christianson 1995 for details) .
Information on the presence of an AWP and/or FOC law applicable to physicians, hospitals, or pharmacies was obtained from a compendium of state laws developed by Ohsfeldt et al. (1998) . This study was based upon a direct review of the state statutes rather than on collected secondary classifications.
The market characteristics came chiefly from the Area Resource File, supplemented with data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Approximately 11% of the MSAs straddle state boundaries. In such cases, the presence of the laws (and other state-level variables) were measured as the weighted average of the relevant state values. The weights were the proportions of the MSA's population residing in each state. We used this approach under the assumption that an HMO would negotiate with individual hospitals or provider groups and could tailor its local negotiation to reflect the laws in effect in that portion of the MSA. (We also estimated the models using the laws applicable to the portion of the straddle-MSA in which the most people resided. In these regressions, available from the authors, the results were essentially unaffected.) The means, standard deviations, and sources of the data are found in Table 2 . The number of reported MSA markets with usable data in the model varied from 259 in 1991 to 299 in 1995.
The study only examined HMO market share due to data availability. Therefore, we used only AWP and FOC laws that relate to HMOs. Three alternative measures of AWP/FOC regulatory intensity were employed. One was a set of dummy variables indicating the number of provider types (hospital, physician, pharmacy) covered by AWP laws and FOC laws: a dummy equal to 1 if all three provider types were covered, a dummy equal to 1 if only one or two provider types were covered, and both equal to 0 if there were no laws in effect. The second set of measures counted the number of AWP or FOC laws applicable to each type of provider. A state with both an AWP and a FOC law applicable to pharmacies, for example, would have ''pharmacy laws'' coded as a ''2.''
The third set of measures was based on an ''intensity of regulation'' construct analogous to that employed in Vita (2001) . Vita used the intensity categories provided by Marsteller et al. (1997) to define states as having ''strong'' AWP/FOC laws or ''weak'' AWP/FOC laws (the latter consisting of all of Marsteller et al.'s categories but ''strong''). However, the specific criteria used by Marsteller et al. to assign states to intensity categories over time were not explained in any detail. Moreover, the categories appear to be fixed over the time period considered, despite significant changes in AWP/FOC laws over time.
We developed the following point system to create a regulatory intensity index: one point for each provider segment covered by an AWP law; one point for each provider segment covered by an FOC law; one additional point if all three provider types were covered by AWP laws; one additional point if all three provider types were covered by FOC laws; and one additional point if both AWP and FOC laws affecting any type of provider were present. The resulting index ranged from 0 (no laws) to 9 (though the value of 8 was not computationally possible). The rationale for this scoring is straightforward. A law affecting more provider types is likely to be more constraining because it limits the HMO's ability to find substitutes. As noted earlier, an HMO conceivably could avoid an AWP affecting hospitals by carefully selecting physicians who predominantly admit patients to the hospitals the HMO prefers. A law affecting all provider types is likely to reduce substantially these sorts of substitution options. Thus, states with laws covering all providers received additional weight. States that enact both AWP and FOC laws further restrict an HMO's ability to arrange legal contracts that avoid the law, so these states also got additional weight. The distribution of the intensity index in the sample is reported in Table 3 . MSAs in states with an intensity index value of 5 or greater were classified as ''high'' intensity; those with an index value of 3 or 4 were classified as ''moderate'' intensity; those with an index value of 1 or 2 were classified as ''low'' intensity.
The market characteristics used in the model included the population residing in the MSA. It is expected that larger MSAs will have larger HMO market shares. Until the mid-1990s, managed care enrollment was concentrated among large employers, and large employers are disproportionately located in larger cities . Population density also was included. It is expected that more densely populated MSAs will have greater HMO market shares because fewer provider locations may be needed to cover the market. We included the proportions of the population over age 64 and under age 20 to reflect the age distribution in the MSA. The literature suggests that HMO enrollment tends to be concentrated among working-age populations. The proportions of the population that are African American and other nonwhite were included to explore racial differences in HMO market share.
We included per capita income (in constant 1995 dollars) and the unemployment rate to capture income and employment effects. Managed care enrollment appears to be an inferior good, decreasing with higher income. However, lower unemployment is expected to result in higher managed care penetration as more marginal workers gain employment and obtain managed care coverage.
Our model also included the Medicare average adjusted per capita cost (AAPCC) as both a measure of the potential profitability of Medicare risk contracts and the costs of medical care in an area. Higher AAPCC rates suggest that HMO market shares will be higher because more elderly people will be enrolled. However, a high AAPCC rate also suggests that health care costs in the area are high, perhaps decreasing the percentage of the MSA population with insurance and, consequently, decreasing the share of the MSA population enrolled in HMOs. The variable used was the average Medicare Part A rate in the counties comprising the MSA, weighted by the proportion of Medicare beneficiaries in the MSA residing in each county. The resulting value was converted to constant 1995 dollars using the Consumer Price Index, for all items.
Also included was a variable indicating the percentage of all firms in the state with more than 1,000 employees. Large employers tend to be self-insured for at least some of their employee health benefit plan options. Through the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), state insurance regulations such as AWP/FOC laws may not be binding on these self-insured offerings. Indeed, it was only with the 2003 U.S. Supreme Court decision that this issue was resolved (Kentucky Association of Health Plans, Inc. vs. Miller, 123 S Ct. 1471). Any direct muting of the impact of AWP/FOC laws associated with self-insurance is likely to be greater for PPOs than HMOs, but one might expect the overall impact of AWP/FOC laws on health insurance markets to be less pronounced in states with high levels of self-insurance. Time was included as a series of dummy variables, with 1995 as the reference year, to account for the secular trend in managed care growth. Morrisey and Jensen (1997) suggest that this trend may be related to the flow of information on the nature of managed care and its acceptability with workers.
Politial Measures
Laws are not enacted randomly, but result from a political process. Earlier work suggests the difficulty of using instrumental variables (IV) techniques to predict the enactment of AWP/FOC laws (Ohsfeldt et al. 1998) . A number of potential instruments were evaluated but found lacking using Staiger-Stock (1997) criteria. As an alternative to an IV approach, we followed the tradition of studies of alcohol taxes (Saffer and Grossman 1987) and abortion services (Blank, George, and London 1996) , among others, by treating general preferences for regulation as fixed effects at the state level. Further, we also added state political ideology and partisan competition variables as proxy measures for any time-varying preferences for the regulation within states.
In the public choice literature, the ideology of elected politicians revealed through voting patterns is assumed to reflect the tastes and preferences of interest groups among their constituents. For this study, statewide political ideology was measured by the average rating of a state's congressional delegation by the American Conservative Union (ACU). By considering votes on federal questions, the measure is more reflective of political tastes within a state as a whole and less of local issues before the state legislatures.
Another factor potentially reflecting tastes for regulation is the extent of partisan competition for control of state government. In more competitive states, elected officials may work more actively to provide legislative services to constituents. We derived partisan competition from an updated version of Ranney's (1976) Index of Democratic Control (IDC). The IDC reflects the make-up of a state government; it is defined as the percentage of Democratic representatives in the state house, plus the percentage of Democratic senators in the state senate, plus 100 if the governor is a Democrat, plus the percentage of the vote for the Democratic candidate for governor in the most recent general election, divided by 400. The value ranged from 0 (for complete Republican control) to 100 (for complete Democratic control). A measure of interparty political competition was derived from the IDC and was defined as [50-abs(IDC-50)], which ranged from 0 (no competition) to 50 (equal party strength). Greater competition typically is hypothesized to lead to more legislation. However, the effect is ambiguous in that one would expect the political process to be more attuned to the will of the more influential group, whether it favors or opposes a particular bill, when the process is more competitive. The IDC also was included in the model to account for the identity of the dominant party in less competitive states (for an application of these measures see, for example, Ohsfeldt and Gohmann 1992) .
Data for all of the political measures came from Barone and Ujifusa's The Almanac of American Politics (1995-98) . The values were lagged one year to reflect the ideology and political competition in place when a law was potentially considered, enacted, or repealed. We estimated the models with and without the political variables. The political variables did not achieve statistical significance themselves. However, failure to include the political variables reduced the magnitude and significance of the regulatory intensity measures while having little impact on the two alternative measures of AWP and FOC regulation. The intensity variables were the broadest measures of regulatory intervention and the place where one would expect measures of political sentiment to have had the greatest impact (the regressions without the political measures are available from the authors).
Results Table 4 reports model results for two alternative regression specifications. First, the ''basic'' model includes only the laws themselves, market characteristics, and year dummies. The second model (''full'') employs both state ''fixed effects,'' and political ideology and competition measures, capturing potential time-varying preferences for regulation. Both models were estimated using the three alternative strategies to account for regulatory impact: count of the laws, application of the laws, and intensity of the laws.
Count of Laws
The law count dummy measures of intensity are summarized in the two left columns. In the basic model, the coefficient of the dummy for one or two AWP laws is not statistically significant. In contrast, the coefficient for the dummy for all three AWP laws implies that HMOs in such states would have a market share 4.9 percentage points lower than HMOs in states with no AWP laws. (Recall that the mean HMO share in the sample is 15.2%). This is consistent with the hypothesis that laws covering all types of providers have more impact than laws covering only one or two types of providers. However, in the full model, which controls for differences across states via state fixed effects and political taste variables, the coefficient of the dummy for one or two AWP laws is positive and statistically significant ( p ¼ .02), contrary to expectations. Also, the point estimate of the coefficient for the dummy for all three AWP laws is reduced by two-thirds compared to the basic model, and is not statistically significant. Thus, in the full model, AWP laws have no apparent negative impact on HMO market share.
The coefficient of the dummy variable for one or two FOC laws is negative and statistically significant in the basic model, whereas the coefficient of the dummy for all three FOC laws is positive and statistically significant. However, the estimates for these coefficients are considerably different in the full model. The coefficient of the dummy for all three FOC laws becomes negative and statistically significant ( p , .01) in the full model. The full model results suggest that HMOs in MSAs with FOC laws covering all three provider types would have a market share 9.9 percentage points lower than HMOs in MSAs with no FOC laws; those with only one or two laws would have HMO market shares 4.9 percentage points lower.
As noted, theory suggests that the impact of an FOC law should be smaller than the impact of an AWP law. Specifically, an FOC law only requires some coverage of services provided by non-panel providers and permits higher patient cost sharing than with panel providers. If HMOs were to work around this restriction by increasing copayments or coinsurance rates for services provided by non-panel providers, FOC laws could have a minimal impact on overall plan costs if the resulting out-of-panel service utilization was modest. However, the full model results do not support the hypothesis that AWP laws are more restrictive and present greater barriers to HMO growth than FOC laws.
Application of Laws
The middle columns of Table 4 report the results of measuring AWP and FOC laws in terms of the providers covered. The results from both the basic and full models suggest that laws affecting physicians drive the AWP/FOC reductions in HMO market share. It often is said that physician decisions determine health care resource use. Findings from this set of regressions suggest that when HMOs are unable to limit their panels of physicians, their ability to control costs overall may be inhibited to a degree that lowers market share.
Regulatory Intensity
Finally, looking at the two right hand columns of Table 4 shows that in the basic model, high regulatory intensity is associated with a 7.4 percentage-point reduction in HMO market share ( p , .01), compared to market share in MSAs with no regulation (the comparison group). The point estimate of the high intensity variable is reduced in magnitude substantially in the full model but remains statistically significant ( p , .01). In contrast, moderate regulatory intensity has small but statistically insignificant effects in both models, and low regulatory intensity is insignificant in the basic model, yet has an unexpected positive but borderline significant effect in the full model ( p ¼ .07).
The full model results imply that high regulatory intensity is associated with a 4.7 percentage-point reduction in HMO market share, which translates into a differential of nearly 31% at the sample means. This is a substantial impact. It is possible that this estimate is plausible in magnitude; however, it also is possible that the magnitude is in part attributable to unobserved characteristics of the MSAs correlated with regulatory intensity within the relatively small number of states with high regulatory intensity. As noted, it is possible or even likely that AWP/FOC intensity and HMO market share are jointly determined, such that AWP/FOC intensity is endogenous for HMO share. No suitable instruments were identified that would enable regulatory intensity to be treated as an endogenous variable in the analysis. As a type of exogeneity test, following Gruber and Hanratty (1995) , Friedberg (1998) and Vita (2001) , we included a dummy variable set equal to one in the year preceding the change in classification to high regulatory intensity. If regulatory changes were exogenous for HMO market share, then the coefficient on the lead dummy variable should equal zero. If the coefficient on the lead dummy were statistically different from zero, it would imply that there are unobserved factors in those MSAs correlated with the regulatory change that affect HMO share.
In a state fixed-effects model that excludes the political variables (available from the authors), the coefficient of the lead dummy variable for high regulatory intensity is negative with borderline statistical significance (p¼.11). This suggests that MSAs in states with high regulatory intensity may have time-varying characteristics that dampen HMO growth and which are unaccounted for in the fixed-effects model. Indeed, in the full model, the coefficient of the lead dummy variable is not statistically significant ( p ¼ .24). Thus, at least some of these unobserved factors appear to be correlated with the state political variables included in the full model. Although a finding of non-statistical significance for the coefficient of the lead dummy variable in the full model is reassuring, we cannot rule out the possibility that unobservables correlated with the change in regulatory intensity are inflating the estimated magnitude of high intensity on HMO market share. Thus, it might be appropriate to view the results reported here as ''upper bound'' estimates.
Other Findings
Turning briefly to the other results, and focusing only on the full model, MSAs with larger populations have larger HMO market shares. Greater population density and larger proportions of older and younger residents lead to smaller HMO market shares. Larger proportions of nonwhites, both African American and others, are associated with larger HMO market shares. The AAPCC payment rate has a non-trival impact on HMO market share. This reflects the net effect of the higher payment levels and the higher health care costs in the community.
While there is no statistically significant effect of per capita income, a one percentage-point decrease in the unemployment rate, from the mean of 6.15% to 5.15%, is associated with a 1.1 to 1.2 percentage-point increase in HMO market share. The estimated coefficient of the large employer variable is negative, but it is statistically significant only in the model using the AWP/FOC law count measures.
Discussion
This study has examined the effect of any willing provider and freedom of choice laws on metropolitan-area HMO market share over the period 1989 to 1995. Several points are worthy of note. First, the laws regulating HMOs have differential effects on HMO market share depending upon the comprehensiveness of the laws and the number and types of providers covered. In areas with less intensive regulation, HMOs may have relatively little difficulty in channeling patients to a subset of truly ''preferred'' providers within the larger set of providers who have contracts. It could be, for instance, that HMOs can contract easily with multiple hospitals, but use their physician network to channel patients. Under this scenario, HMOs also may be able to assure particular hospitals that they actually are ''preferred,'' so that the equivalent of the lowest price is obtained nonetheless for the ''preferred'' hospitals. The findings with respect to the influence of physician AWP/FOC laws may bear this out. It is limitations on selective contracting with physicians, not hospitals or pharmacies, that substantially affect HMO market share.
Second, perhaps the most surprising finding is the apparently greater impact of FOC laws compared to AWP laws. The Rand Health Insurance Experiment (Newhouse et al. 1993) found that most of the effects of coinsurance rates on service use occurred between zero and 25% coinsurance. It is conceivable that if within-plan coinsurance rates are already in the 20% to 25% range, higher coinsurance rates for out-of-plan use may be relatively ineffective in discouraging use of out-of-plan providers. If so, higher out-of-pocket payments may not be effective in reducing the use of out-of-panel providers. This would increase the effectiveness of FOC laws. (Data on this point do not appear to be available. However, Gabel et al. [2002] report that in 1996, the year nearest our sample, the typical PPO in-plan deductible was $181 and the out-of-plan deductible was $276.) It may be possible to structure contracts using language or terms (other than price) to make it much more likely that only the HMO's truly ''preferred'' providers accept the contract. If so, the HMO may be able to avoid an AWP law while not being able to avoid the FOC laws. Also, it is possible that the tight labor market in the mid-1990s reduced the marketability of plans with highly limited preferred provider panels-HMOs might have had to expand preferred panels even without AWP laws. Thus, FOC laws might have been more ''binding'' on HMOs than AWP laws.
Third, it is clear that the estimates of the effects of the laws depend critically on how the potential endogeneity of the laws is addressed. We view the ''full models'' to be the superior specifications. Conceptually, they offer a better opportunity to purge the estimates of the endogenous effects of legislative enactment. However, while the use of state fixed effects and regulatory preference variables help, the results of our full model still may reflect something of a ''worst case'' scenario of the consequences of AWP/FOC intensity. Our full model results suggest that the enactment of an FOC law covering all three types of providers would reduce HMO market share by 9.9 percentage points, or a 65% differential in share at the mean market share of 15.2%. Likewise, the full model results suggest the enactment of high intensity AWP/FOC laws would reduce HMO market share by 4.7 percentage points, or a 31% differential at the mean market share. If these estimates were accurate, one would have expected to see press reports of HMOs leaving at least some states because of the enactment of the laws. For example, the passage of individual insurance reform in Tennessee prompted many carriers to leave the market; one would have expected similar reactions in FOC states if the effects were as large as those estimated here.
To put the magnitude of the estimated effects into context, consider the findings reported by Vita (2001) . High intensity or ''strong'' AWP laws were associated with a 1.8% increase in per capita total health spending, a 2.1% increase in hospital spending, and a 2.7% increase in physician spending. Recall these effects were for spending by all payers in a state, not just those affected by AWP/FOC laws directly. If AWP/FOC laws only affected HMOs, given the 10% HMO market share in his sample, the results would imply that strong AWP laws would increase HMO spending by 20% to 30%. If true, this could easily reduce market share by 25% to 30%. If both HMOs and PPOs are affected by AWP/FOC laws, assuming their joint market share is 50%, the implied average HMO/ PPO spending increase due to strong AWP would be in the range of 4% to 6%. If these spending effects fell disproportionately on HMOs, a substantial impact on market share might be expected. Of course, another possibility is that the results reported by Vita also are inflated to some degree by unobservables. Indeed, we believe the estimated impacts of both our study and Vita's must be inflated at least to some degree by unobservables.
Finally, given the implausibly large estimates of the impact of AWP/FOC laws generated by econometric assessments, perhaps a next step in an evaluation of AWP and FOC laws is a series of case studies that investigate the nature of the contracts and practices employed by managed care firms and providers under different legislative regimes. Do managed care firms contract with one type of provider to channel patients to other types of providers, in spite of their seemingly identical contracts? If so, how is this accomplished? Is it possible to structure the terms of contracts in a way that effectively precludes low volume or low quality providers from participating? How does this work? In other words, future research should strive to open up the ''black box'' to see what, if any, effects these laws have on HMO operations.
